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NOTES
CONTRACTUAL DISCLAIMER OF THE DONAHUE
FIDUCIARY DUTY: THE EFFICACY OF THE
ANTI-DONAHUE CLAUSE
One responsibility of the lawyer advising a client in structuring and incorporating
a closely held business is to structure a corporate framework which will either preclude
potential problems in the operation and management of the corporation, or which will
enable the legitimate resolution of such problems in favor of the client. The decision of
the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts in the 1975 case of Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Company presented the Massachusetts corporate bar with a new element in
the planning of close corporations. In Donahue, the Supreme Judicial Court imposed
upon shareholders in Massachusetts close corporations2
 a strict duty of utmost good
faith and loyalty toward all other shareholders of their corporation.' The decision
reversed the court's prior rule of law, that the mere ownership of stock, independent of
other considerations, imposed no fiduciary duty on shareholders.' The strict fiduciary
standard of utmost good faith and loyalty imposed by Donahue on shareholders of closely
held corporations was identical to that to which the court had previously held partners
in their dealings with one another.' As such, the new Donahue duty was considerably
367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
2
 After noting that there is no single generally accepted definition of a close corporation, the
Donahue court considered various scholarly and judicial descriptions, accepting aspects of delineation
promulgated by several such sources. 367 Mass. at 585, 328 N.E.2d at 511 (citing Caller v. Caller,
32 III. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965) (in close corporations "the stock is held in few hands,
or in few families, and not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling"); Kruger v. Gerth,
16 N.Y.2d 802, 806, 210 N.E.2d 355, 357 263 N.Y.S.2d I, 4 (1965) (Fuld, J., dissenting) ("manage-
ment and ownership are substantially identical" in close corporations); Note, Statutory Assistance for
Closely Held Corporations, 71 HARV. L. Rev. 1498, 1498 (1958) (emphasizing integration of ownership
and management)). The Donahue court defined a close corporation as having: "(1) a small number
of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder
participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation." Id. at 586, 328
N.E.2d at 511.
Id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
See, e.g., Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 9, 105 N.E.2d 843, 846 (1952) (stockholder
relationship not one of trust and confidence even where relationship began as partnership); Eno
Sys., Inc. v. Eno, 311 Mass. 334, 341, 41 N.E.2d 17, 20 (1942) (defendant's ownership of stock in
the plaintiff imposed no duty on defendant to warn plaintiff of intent to terminate license); Mairs
v. Madden, 307 Mass. 378, 380, 30 N.E.2d 242, 244 (1940) ("mere ownership of stock does not
create a fiduciary relation between the stockholders"); Bell v. Fred T. Ley & Co., Inc., 278 Mass.
60, 75, 179 N.E. 294, 299 (1932) (stockholders occupy no fiduciary relation to fellow stockholders).
See 367 Mass. at 593-95, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16; DeCotis v. D'Antona, 350 Mass. 165, 168,
214 N.E.2d 21, 23 (1966); Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1952). See
infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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more stringent than that of good faith and inherent fairness, which is applied in all
jurisdictions to officers and directors," and which in most jurisdictions is also applied to
majority shareholders in a position of control.'
The language used by the Donahue court was broad and sweeping, and did not
clearly delineate the boundaries for application of this partnership-like duty." The fol-
lowing year, the Supreme Judicial Court more fully defined the nature and object of the
Donahue duty in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.° In Wilkes the court, acknowledging
the right of majority shareholders to control a close corporation, established an analytical
procedure for claims arising under Donahue in which a legitimate business purpose
defense is balanced against the minority's rights under Donahue.'°
Donahue and its progeny have been extensively and substantively cited in both state
and federal courts," and have attracted considerable legal discussions The court's
declaration of the Donahue strict fiduciary duty and its subsequent clarification of that
duty in Wilkes particularly drew the attention of the Massachusetts corporate bar. This
new duty appeared to be one which could seriously impinge on the freedom of persons
involved in a close corporation to define, through the vehicle of their corporate frame-
work, the precise nature of their rights and duties inter se.° These considerations
6 See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 109, 460 P.2d 464, 472, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 600 (1969); Condec Corp v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 363, 230 A.2(1 769, 775
(1967); Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 394 Ill. 94, 108, 67 N.E.2d 265, 275 (1946), rev'g
325 Ill. App. 459, 60 N.E.2d 560 (1945); Risvold v. Gustafson, 209 Minn. 357, 359, 296 N.W. 411,
412 (1941); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.V.2d 494, 496-97, 248 N.E.2d 910, 911-12, 301 N.Y.S.2d
78, 79-81 (1969); Gilmore v. W.J. Gilmore Drug Co., 279 Pa. 193, 195, 123 A. 730, 730 (1924);
International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 576 (Tex. 1963); Grognet v. Fox
Valley Trucking Serv., 45 Wis. 2d 235, 241, 172 N.W.2d 812, 816 (1969).
7 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 594 & n.20, 328 N.E.2d at 516 & n.20; see also Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 306 (1939); see generally Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Controlling Shareholders, 7 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 467, 467 (1956).
" See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 593 & n.18, 328 N.E.2d at 515 & n.18. The breadth of the Donahue
decision was forcefully criticized by justice Wilkins in his concurrence to the decision. justice Wilkins
expressed his concern that this breadth of language implied too complete an analogy to partnership
principles and thus imperiled all operations of the corporation as they pertained to minority
stockholders. See id. at 604, 328 N.E.2d at 521 (Wilkins, j., concurring). See also infra notes 121,
225-36 and accompanying text.
9 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976). See infra notes 122-67 and accompanying text.
in Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
" See O'Neal, Close Corporations.' Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAw. 873,
886 (1978) [hereinafter cited as O'Neal, Recommended Reform].
' 2 See, e.g., Note, Stockholder's Duty of "Utmost Good Faith and Loyalty" Requires Controlling Share-
holder Selling a Close Corporation its Own Shares to Cause the Corporation to Offer to Purchase a Ratable
Number of Shares from Minority - Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 89 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]; Note, Shareholders in a Close Corporation Owe to One Another
Substantially the Same Fiduciary Duty Owed by Partners to One Another: Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 21 Vim.. L. REv, 307 (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as Villanova Note]; Eleptiante, The Impact
of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. on the Law of Corporate Freezeouts, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. L. § 17.2
[hereinafter cited as Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law Note).
" Their right so to do is premised in their constitutional rights to freedom of contract, see U.S.
CONST. art.l, § 10, c1.1, and in the fact that corporate structure and the common law rules of
partnership have traditionally been bottomed on contract. The limitations on that right stem from
the societal concerns voiced by the Donahue court, that "captive" minority shareholders in a close
corporation (by definition, the stockholder in a close corporation has no ready market for his shares,
Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511; and in any event, assuming that an oppressed
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prompted a concert of evasive action by corporations and incorporators who wished,
insofar as the law would allow it, to draft their own definition of any and all legal duties
which they owed to one another." A substantial portion of the corporate bar therefore
sought to circumvent the new duty, and their effort spawned a new variety of corporate
legal devices designed for that purpose which the corporate bar has called "Anti -Donahue
Clauses" (ADCs)."
As drafted by members of the Massachusetts corporate bar, ADCs may appear in a
corporation's articles of organization, in its bylaws, in shareholder agreements, in em-
ployment contracts, or in share transfer restrictions. The ADCs currently employed by
Massachusetts law firms for their corporate clients vary substantially in the extent of
their intended effect. There are two general categories of ADCs: those which are nar-
rowly tailored to permit specific corporate practices," and those which cover a broader
spectrum of the Donahue duty.'? The latter variant may be drafted so broadly as to
constitute a waiver by minority shareholders of substantially all rights to which they are
entitled under the Donahue decision."' '1'0 date, the efficacy of any variant of these ADCs
has yet to be tested by the Massachusetts judiciary. The purpose of this note is to examine
the nature of the Donahue fiduciary duty, and on that basis to propose a method of
dispositive analysis applicable to both broad and narrow disclaimers of the Donahue duty.
Part I of this note will examine the evolutionary development and application of
fiduciary duty in Donahue and its progenitors and progeny, and will demonstrate that
Donahue represents a protection of the reasonable expectations of investors in close
financial relationships. Part H will discuss the response of the Massachusetts corporate
bar to Donahue, including the development of the anti -Donahue clause. Part [II of this
note will briefly discuss the equitable doctrine of reasonable expectations in the law of
the United States and the Commonwealth countries, and will describe the evolution in
stockholder gives full disclosure of the difficulty which is causing him to sell, it certainly is unlikely
that he will realize the full value of his shares in that sale) should not be treated abusively or unjustly
due to the "avarice, expediency or self-interest" of the controlling shareholder(s). Id. at 591-94,
328 N.E.2d at 514-15.
4 This assertion is based upon an informal survey, conducted by the author, of large Massa-
chusetts law firms which include a substantial amount of corporate work in their practice. The
author conducted the survey on the basis of entirely unscientific principles, by contacting a number
of larger law firms with a corporate "department" and seeking out persons in that department who
were familiar with the Donahue case and its immediate and current ramifications. The persons whom
1 contacted initially often suggested that I contact another member of their firm as being more
knowledgeable on the subject than they were. Additionally, there were a select number of attorneys
to whom I was referred by several sources. As a result, I spoke at some length with a number of
attorneys who were extremely competent and experienced in the area of structuring close corpo-
rations and their concurrent fiduciary duties. I am confident that the results of this survey, although
unscientific, are both an accurate representation of the current opinions and concerns among the
Massachusetts corporate bar as they regard close corporate fiduciary concerns and an accurate
portrayal of the evolution of those opinions and concerns.
The majority of those with whom 1 spoke requested that I preserve their anonymity. Conse-
quently I have omitted all references to the names either of firms or of attorneys.
" The term "anti-Donahue clause" does not commonly appear in current writings on fiduciary
duty in close corporations. The term, as it is used in this note, is a result of the informal survey
described supra note 14.
'" See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
" Id.
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the Commonwealth countries' law of a similar analogy of partnership to close corpora-
tions with a concurrently stricter fiduciary duty. It will suggest that the history and
purpose of the Donahue fiduciary duty and its sister duty in the law of the Commonwealth
countries indicate that the courts should utilize a two-tiered test to judge the efficacy of
an ADC as a contractual defense against a showing that a corporate shareholder has
breached some aspect of his Donahue fiduciary duty. The first tier of the proposed test
will be essentially contractual in nature. It should determine the adequacy of the share-
holder's consent to the ADC by an examination of the sufficiency of understanding by
the shareholder of the meaning and effect of the ADC at the time that the shareholder
became a party to it. The second tier of the proposed test should examine the effect of
the ADC upon the shareholder's legitimate although unwritten expectations of trust and
loyalty, as they are embodied in the Donahue fiduciary duty. Further, it should examine
the contract itself for unconscionahility. It is the thesis of this note that carefully drawn
ADCs, which satisfy the contractual tier and frankly alter a shareholder's expectations,
should be given effect by the courts. The blanket ADC, however, by its very nature, will
be held to be an inequitable obstacle to the unsophisticated shareholders' ability to
formulate accurate expectations. As a result specific terms of the blanket ADC may be
overlooked by the court in its consideration of any claimed fiduciary breach. Thus, while
the Donahue fiduciary duty should prove difficult to contractually abolish except in
relation to the most sophisticated shareholders, it should be possible to avoid the Donahue
duty for a specific and legitimate purpose, at least to the extent that it has been inter-
preted to grant such rights as a rule of equal opportunity in stock repurchase, or an
implicit guarantee of employment.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DONAHUE DUTY
A. History
The Donahue fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty is derived from part-
nership law and is diametrically opposed to historical notions of corporate shareholder
relations. In any situation where one exercises influence over the possessions or property
interests of another, a fiduciary relationship may be said to arise." The stringent fiducial
standard for the relationship among partners has remained a universal constant in
American law. 20 Numerous jurisdictions define the standard as one of "undivided loy-
alty."21 The Massachusetts standard has long been held out as that of "utmost good faith
and loyalty."22 In the 1913 case of Holmes v. Darling," the Supreme Judicial Court
explained this standard with the observation that "the law imposes upon each partner
the duty of exercising toward his copartner the utmost integrity and good faith in all
partnership affairs. In transactions concerning the firm he must consider their mutual
welfare, rather than his own private benefit.""
19 3 H. OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 1569 at 624 (1959).
20 See S. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP § 21.1(2) (2d ed. 1960). Rowley points out that while
the joint adventurer's fiduciary duty is necessarily limited by the scope of the venture, there is no
similar limitation on the partnership duty. Id.
21 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
22 DeCotis v. D'Antoria, 350 Mass. 165, 168, 214 N.E.2d 21, 23 (1966); Cardullo v. Landau,
329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1952).
23 213 Mass. 303, 100 N.E. 611 (1913).
24 Id. at 305, 100 N.E. at 612.
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Corporate shareholders, on the other hand, traditionally had no fiduciary duty
among one another by virtue of the mere ownership of stock, 25 because they shared no
commonality of interest in the corporate property. 26
 That property was deemed to be
vested in the corporation, not in the individuals who held the stock of the corporation. 27
Thus, a shareholder's only control over the corporation lay in hiS power to elect corporate
officials,28 and the sole fiduciary duty ran from these elected officials to the corporation. 29
This latter duty continues to the present day, ,both in the United States and in the
Commonwealth countries: although not strictly regarded as trustees, a corporation's
elected officials are equitably held to bear a fiduciary duty of good faith and inherent
fairness to their corporation and its owners. 3° Because of shareholders' purportedly
limited ability to exercise control, and because of the limited and beneficial nature of
their interest in the corporate property, the shareholders were generally held free of
any fiduciary duty inter se." For fourteen decades prior to Donahue it was generally held
by the Massachusetts judiciary that in this respect shareholders in a "corporation, in their
legal relations to each other, differ essentially and radically from partners," 32 and that
"[t]he differences between partnerships and corporations are so strong, that it cannot
be inferred that the equity powers of the Court in respect to the former were intended
to apply to the latter." 33
The view that corporate shareholders, unlike partners, owe no inherent fiduciary
duty inter ,se is illustrated by the reasoning adopted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in the 1905 case of Von Arnin v. American Tubeworks." In that case the plaintiff
See, e.g., Cardullo, 329 Mass. at 9, 105 N.E.2d at 846 (stockholder relationship not one of
trust and confidence even where relationship began as partnership); Eno Sys., Inc. v. Eno, 311
Mass. 334, 341, 41 N.E.2d 17, 20 (1942) (defendant's ownership of stock in the plaintiff imposed
no duty on defendant to warn plaintiff of intent to terminate license); Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass.
378, 380, 30 N.E.2d 242, 244 (1940) ("mere ownership of stock does not create a fiduciary relation
between the stockholders"); Bell v. Fred T. Ley & Co., Inc., 278 Mass. 60, 75, 179 N.E. 294, 299
(1932) (stockholders occupy no fiduciary relation to fellow stockholders).
26 See Pratt v. Bacon, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 123 (1830). In Pratt, the plaintiff filed a plea to the
court's jurisdiction in equity under St. 1823, c. 140, § 2 which granted equitable jurisdiction, inter
alia, over partnerships. The court held that the bill could not be sustained because of the magnitude
of the difference between the characteristics of corporations and partnerships. The court stated:
A corporation is an ideal body ... which is deemed ... to have an existence indepen-
dently of that of all the members of which it is composed .... Its real and personal
property is deemed to be vested in the corporation and not in the individuals com-
posing it; and these have no other interest in it, or control over it, than the qualified
ones, of electing officers, and receiving dividends and profits „ . ,
27 Mass. (10 Pick.) at 125-26. See also Flint v. Codman, 247 Mass. 463, 472, 142 N.E. 256, 259
(1924) ("The corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its stockholders. Commonly
the stockholders of a corporation occupy no fiduciary relation to their fellow stockholders or to the
corporation.").
27 Pratt, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) at 126.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Flint, 247 Mass. at 472, 142 N.E. at 259 (the relation of a director to a corporation
is fiduciary).
50 See generally 3 W. FLE1CHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838 & n.1
(1975 & Stipp. 1984),
Pratt, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) at 126.
32 Id .
" Id. at 125.
94 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680 (1905).
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shareholder alleged misappropriation of corporate funds by shareholders who held
corporate office. 35
 I n upholding an order overruling a demurrer to the plaintiff share-
holder's bill," the court relied on the general fiduciary duty owed a corporation by its
officers37 and made no mention of a fiduciary standard applicable to the defendants by
virtue of their stock ownership. 38 The Massachusetts judiciary explicitly reaffirmed this
traditional view in 1944 by stating, in Leventhal v. Atlantic Finance Corp.," that the differ-
ences between relationships of corporate shareholders inter se and those of partners inter
se was so broad that even in a two man corporation, neither shareholder owed the other
a fiduciary duty. 4°
In spite of these holdings, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had
already begun to make exceptions, based on equitable considerations, to its rigid rule
that no fiduciary duty existed among corporate shareholders by virtue of their stock
ownership. In the 1940 case of Silversmith v. Sydeman,'" for example, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court was faced with an accounting suit involving a two man corpo-
ration. 42
 In contrast to its subsequent rationale in Leventhal, 43 the court responded to the
demand of equitable considerations founded in the reasonable expectations of the com-
plaining shareholder,44 and held the defendant to a higher duty than that of good faith
and inherent fairness.'" The court based its holding on the notion that "the plaintiff and
the defendant were acting as partners in the conduct of the ... [corporation]." 46
Six years after Silversmith, in the cases of Sher v. Sandler" and Mendelsohn v. Leather
Manufacturing Co.," the Massachusetts judiciary again imposed a fiduciary duty among
shareholders in the close corporate context where once there had been none. In both
cases the court imposed among shareholders in a close corporation a duty of full
disclosure49 similar to that imposed upon a fiduciary in dealing with a beneficiary.5° In
"Id. at 518-20, 74 N.E. at 680-81.
" Id. at 521, 74 N.E. at 682.
" Id. at 510, 74 N.E. at 681.
58 See id. at 519, 74 N.E. at 681, Because of the dual status of the defendants as both officers
and shareholders, the Von Arnin facts would have been an appropriate situation for application of
a partnership standard, had the court been so inclined. Id,
39 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E.2d 20 (1044).
40 Id. at 198-99, 55 N.E.2d at 23-24.
41 305 Mass. 65, 25 N.E.2d 215 (1940).
42 Id, at 66, 25 N.E.2d at 216.
43 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
44 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 595, 328 N.E.2d at 516.
45 Silversmith, 305 Mass. at 68, 25 N.E.2d at 218.
46 Id. at 68, 25 N.E.2d at 217.
47 325 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950). In Sher, the two shareholders had agreed to an equal
division of stock, profits, control and information. Id. at 350, 90 N.E.2d at 537-38. The court stated
that under the agreement each party owed the other a duty, similar to that owed by a fiduciary, of
"fullest disclosure." Id. at 353, 90 N.E.2d at 539. Therefore, general fiduciary principles were held
to govern the case. Id.
18 326 Mass. 226, 93 N.E.2d 537 (1950). In Mendelsohn, the plaintiff filed a bill in equity against
two defendants with whom he had formed a corporation, alleging failure to disclose material facts
surrounding his divestiture of stock in the enterprise. Id. at 228, 232, 93 N.E.2d at 539, 541. Finding
that the three had initially embarked upon a joint venture, the court held that their subsequent
incorporation did not alter the partnership-like fiduciary duty of joint venturers, of "utmost good
faith and.loyalty." Id. at 233, 93 N.E.2d at 541.
49 Mendelsohn, 326 Mass. at 232-33, 93 N.E.2d at 541; Slier, 325 Mass. at 354, 90 N.E.2d at 539.
"" 325 Mass, at 353, 90 N.E.2d at 539.
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each case the court imposed upon a shareholder a duty that was more exacting than
that owed by a director to his corporation," or by a majority shareholder to a minority
shareholder." Moreover, in each case the court described its imposition of a stringent
fiduciary duty among the parties as an exercise of its equity powers based upon the facts
peculiar to the close corporation under consideration."
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also discerned a fiduciary duty among
shareholders in the 1959 case of Sarnia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester.." In Samia, three
sisters who held minority interests in a close corporation controlled by their brothers"
charged that their brothers had systematically excluded them from management of the
corporation,66 in part by refusing to issue a stock subscription inherited by the sisters. 57
Relying on the familial relationship as well as the nature of the close corporation, the
Sarnia court found a strict fiduciary relationship among the shareholders of the oil
company, and on that basis denied the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff's suit
should be barred by !aches or the statute of limitations." Acting as a court of equity, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered an even redistribution of the corporate
shares among the parties."
The last exception made on a case-by-case basis to the Massachusetts rule that
shareholders bore no fiduciary relationship among themselves by virtue of the mere
ownership of stock occurred in the 1962 case of Wilson v. jennings.6° In Wilson, three
men joined together to form a corporation, envisioning, as the trial court found, an
equal division of the ownership of shares among the three of them. 61 Through a series
of complex and apparently clandestine transactions one of the three men, Jennings,
managed to cause the corporation to issue a substantial amount of additional stock to
himself. 62 In affirming the lower court's holding, Justice Cutter stated that it could be
found that the three shareholders were undertaking "a joint venture in corporate form
...."62 Because this was determined to be the shareholders' understanding, the court
51 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 597, 328 N.E.2d at 517. Compare Mendelsohn, 326 Mass. at 233, 93
N.E.2d at 541 (imposing on shareholders a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty); Sher, 325 Mass.
at 353, 90 N.E.2d at 539 (relying on shareholder agreement rather than relations between corporate
officials to find affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose), with Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc.,
297 Mass. 398, 410-11, 8 N.E.2d 895, 904-05 (1937) (stating general standard of duty for directors
of a corporation to be an avoidance of bad faith actions or gross negligence in the commission of
good faith actions). 'See also supra note 6 and accompanying text, noting the standard for directors
to be one of good faith and inherent fairness.
52 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 597, 328 N.E.2d at 517. Compare Mendelsohn, 326 Mass. at 233, 93
N.E.2d at 541 (imposing on shareholders a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty); Sher, 325 Mass.
at 353, 90 N.E.2d at 539 (imposing affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose), with sources cited supra
note 7 (imposing a duty of good faith and inherent fairness on majority shareholders).
53 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 597, 328 N.E.2d at 517; Mendelsohn, 326 Mass. at 233, 93 N.E.2d
at 541; Sher, 325 Mass. at 353, 90 N.E.2d at 539.
" 339 Mass. 101, 158 N.E.2d 469 (1959).
" Id. at 106, 158 N.E.2c1 at 472.
56 Id. at 106-07:158 N.E.2d at 473-74.
57 Id. at 107, 158 N.E.2d at 473.
" Id. at 112-13, 158 N.E.2d at 476-77. The court found these considerations to be strengthened
by the surety-bond relationships among the brothers and sisters in the estates of the deceased. Id.
651d. at 116-17, 158 N.E.2d at 478-79.
"0 344 Mass. 608, 184 N.E.2d 642 (1962).
6 ' id. at 615, 184 N.E.2c1 at 646.
62 Id. at 611-14, 184 N.E.2d at 643-45.
63 Id. at 615, 184 N.E.2d at 646.
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found it appropriate to apply the standard of fiduciary trust and confidences' applicable
under the law of partnerships and joint ventures." These case-by-case exceptions to the
pre -Donahue rule concerning relationships among shareholders in a close corporation
illuminate the Donahue court's statement that its holding was a "natural outgrowth of
prior case lavv." 66
For over thirty years prior to its decision in Donahue, the Massachusetts Supreme
judicial Court had consistently sanctioned the imposition of this higher level of duty on
shareholders in close corporations, 67 as an exercise of judicial equity powers." As an
exercise in equity, however, the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court in Silversmith, 69
Sher, 7° Mendelsohn," Samia, 72 and Wilson73 were based on and limited to the particular
facts before the court in each case. The decision in Donahue, on the other hand, represents
the solidification of these equitable decisions into a general principle."
B. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company
In 1975 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype.
Compan y,75 declared a general rule that shareholders in a close corporation owed one
another the same strict standard of "utmost good faith and loyalty'76 to which the court
had previously held partners in their dealings with one another." This new standard
was imposed where none had previously existed under Massachusetts law." Importantly,
the standard was even more stringent than that in those jurisdictions which, unlike
Massachusetts, had held the mere ownership of stock to impose a duty of good faith
and inherent fairness running from the majority to the minority."
64 Id.
63 Id. For a discussion of the applicable duty, see supra notes 4-7, 20-22 and accompanying
text, and see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
66 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 595, 328 N.E.2d at 516.
67 See supra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
66 It is of import in postulating the efficacy of an ADC to note that a court acting in equity is
far more likely to impose or retain a fiduciary duty where none had existed, than to erode that
same duty. See, e.g., Holmes v. Darling, 213 Mass. 303, 305, 100 N.E. 611, 612 (1913); Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). In discussing the rule binding partner-like
fiduciaries, Chief Justice Cardozo noted that "[u]ncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating
erosion' of particular exceptions." Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546 (quoting Wendt v.
Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 444, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (1926)). It is evident that the partnership.fiduciary
duty serves to protect the expectation of partners that when they enter into the intimate partnership
control relationship, they will be in a relationship of trust and loyalty. The duty imposed by Donahue
reflects a recognition of the same expectations in the close corporate setting, and it is appropriate
that it be guarded by the courts as jealously as is the partnership duty.
69 305 Mass. 65, 25 N.E.2d 215 (1940). See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
" 325 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950). See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
7 ' 326 Mass. 226, 93 N.E.2d 537 (1950). See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
72 339 Mass. 101, 158 N.E.2d 469 (1959). See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
" 344 Mass. 608, 184 N.E.2d 642 (1962), See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
74
 infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
" 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E,2d 505 (1975).
26 Id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
77 See DeCotis, 350 Mass. at 168, 214 N.E.2d at 23; Cardullo, 329 Mass. at 8, 105 N.E.2d at 845.
78 See 367 Mass. at 593-95, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16; see supra note 4 and accompànying text.
79 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
September 1985]	 ANTI -DONAHUE CLAUSE	 1223
Harry Rodd and Joseph Donahue were hired in 1935 and 1936, respectively, by
Royal Electrotype of New England ("Royal of New England"), a wholly owned subsidiary
of Royal Electrotype Company ("Royal"). 8° Prior to 1955, Harry Rodd was made general
manager and treasurer of Royal of New England, and purchased two hundred shares
of Royal of New England common stock from Royal.'" During this same period Joseph
Donahue, at Harry Rodd's suggestion, purchased an additional fifty shares of the same
stock for himself. 82 In June of 1955, Royal of New England purchased the remaining
750 of the 1,000 shares of its own stock then outstanding." A substantial portion of the
cash used in this transaction was loaned to Royal of New England by Harry Rodd. 84 The
purchase of these outstanding shares left Harry Rodd the 80% sole majority shareholder
of Royal of New England, and Joseph Donahue the 20% sole minority shareholder.
In June of 1960, Royal of New England was renamed Rodd Electrotype Company
of New England, Inc. ("Rodd Electrotype" ).B 5 Harry Rodd's controlling influence resulted
in the appointment of his sons Frederick and Charles to positions of control within Rodd
Electrotype, and in 1965, Charles succeeded Harry as president and general manager
of Rodd Electrotype."'" From 1959 to 1967, Harry Rodd gave 117 shares equally to his
three children, resulting in ownership by each child of thirty-nine shares." He returned
two shares to the Rodd Electrotype treasury, and retained the remaining eighty-one
shares for himself." In 1968, Joseph Donahue and his wife Euphemia gave five shares
to their son, Dr. Robert Donahue, such that on Joseph Donahue's death, Euphemia
became the sole owner of the remaining forty-five share block of stock. 89
Against this background, between May of 1970 and March of 1971, Harry Rodd's
sons negotiated with him an amicable retirement arrangement whereby Rodd Electrotype
purchased from Harry forty-five shares for $800 per share ($36,000), each of his three
children purchased two shares from him for $800 per share, and Harry donated to each
child ten shares. 8° The result was the complete divestiture of Harry's holdings, and
ownership by each child of a block of fifty-one shares. 9 L The Donahue family still held
fifty shares. 92
The Donahues first learned of Rodd Electrotype's purchase of Harry Rodd's shares
at a special shareholders meeting convened on March 31, 1971. 89 At this meeting, the
Donahues voted their disapproval of the purchase of Harry Rodd's shares for $800 per
0° 367 Mass. at 580-81, 328 N.E.2d at 509.
8 ] Id. at 581, 328 N.E.2d at 509.
82 Id. Donahue was hired as a finisher of electrotype plates and received promotions, in 1946,
to plant superintendent, and in 1955, to corporate vice president, but he never participated in the
management side of the business. Id.
" Id. Royal of New England purchased 725 shares from Royal Electrotype Company and 25
from Lawrence W. Kelly. Id.
" Id. at 581-82, 328 N.E.2d at 509.
88 Id. at 582, 328 N.E.2d at 509.
88 Id. at 582, 328 N.E.2d at 509-10.
87 1d. at 582, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
88 1d.
89 Id. at 584 n.8, 328 N.E.2d at 510 n.8.
91)1d. at 583, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
91 Id.
22 Id.
" Id. at 584, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
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share." Between 1965 and 1969. Rodd Electrotype had offered to purchase the Dona-
hues' shares for between $40 and $200 per share." During the weeks following the
March 31 meeting, the Donahues formally requested that the corporation purchase their
shares for $800 per share;"6
 Rodd Electrotype refused to do so."
Euphemia Donahue brought an action in Middlesex Superior Court, seeking to have
the Rodd Electrotype purchase of Harry Rodd's shares rescinded." The trial court
dismissed the case on the merits.99
 Although it was not explicitly stated in the opinion
of the trial court, it was clear from the principles expounded and the authorities cited
that the trial judge had found the purchase to be made in good faith and inherent
fairness, and without prejudice either to the corporation or to the plaintiff.'" In a
rescript opinion, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the holding of the lower
court. 10 '
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, however, reversed the lower court's
decision,m holding that "shareholders in a close corporation owe one another substan-
tially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one
another, namely, a duty of the utmost good faith and loyalty." 1" The court then found
that the majority shareholders' group had breached this fiduciary duty by causing Rodd
Electrotype to purchase a majority shareholder's shares without offering to purchase a
ratable number of shares for the same price from the minority shareholders.'" By so
holding, the Supreme Judicial Court created an equal opportunity standard for the
repurchase of shares applicable to all Massachusetts close corporations.'"
The Donahue court began its analysis with the identification of three essential factors
which, taken together, it deemed to typify a close corporation; "1) a small number of
shareholders; 2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and 3) substantial majority
shareholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the corpora-
tion."'" Corporations which fit these criteria, the court stated, bear a "striking resem-
blance" to partnerships,'" and require among the shareholders a similar relationship of
"trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the enterprise is to succeed."'"
The court pointed to the vulnerability of minority shareholders in close corporations
to "freeze-outs," "squeeze-outs" and related forms of majority oppression, such as: refusal
to declare dividends; siphoning off of corporate assets via unreasonably high salaries or
rents paid to majority shareholders; deprivation of office or employment for minority
94 hi .
" Id. at 584 n.10, 328 N.E.2d at 511 n.10.
"Id. at 584, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
97 Id.
" Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 1 Mass. App. Ct. 876, 307 N.E.2d 8 (1974).
99 Id,
I"" Id. at 876-77, 307 N.E.2d at 9 (noting the trial court's citation to Winchell v. Plywood, 324
Mass. 171, 174-75, 85 N.E.2d 313, 315 (1949), for the "good faith and without prejudice" standard);
see also 367 Mass. at 580 & n.5, 328 N.E.2d at 508 & n.5 (same).
10 ' 1 Mass. App. Ct. at 876-77, 307 N.E.2d at 9.
102 367 Mass 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
Id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
104 Id. at 603, 328 N.E.2d at 520.
105 Id .
'° Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
107 Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 512.
'" Id. at 587, 328 N.E.2d at 512.
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shareholders, and so on.'°9 The court recognized that at the time that the injury occurs,
there usually are virtually no means by which the minority shareholder may positively
resolve this vulnerability.' 1 " Generally, the minority shareholder cannot sell his shares.'"
Neither can he generally afford to wait for a share market which by the court's own
definition does not currently exist, 12 nor for an alleviation of the majority oppression,
because he has invested the majority of his assets in the corporation and relies thereon
for his livelihood income. 13 According to the court, the vulnerability of the minority
shareholder in a close corporation is typically exacerbated by the general absence of
alternative recourses."' The court cited the difficulty of effective suit given the standard
of public corporation officer/director fiduciary duties. 116 The court further noted that
partners are able to dissolve their partnerships." 6 The corporate shareholder, on the
other hand, lacking an enabling clause in the articles of organization, is denied the ability
to call for corporate dissolution unless he owns at least 50% of the stock. 117 Thus,
according to the court, the minority close corporation shareholder may be trapped in a
situation Inlo outsider would knowingly assume."" 8 The court stated that the minority
shareholder, unable to sell, may have to accede to the majority's demands, which often
take the form or relinquishment of the stock at an inadequate price, completing an
effective "freeze-out."" 9
The court noted the eloquent description by Justice Cardozo, then Chief . justice of
the New York Supreme Court, of the rigorous duty owed by partners and joint venturers
inter se:
joint venturers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible
in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary tics .... Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.I 20
On the basis of the similarity of the attributes of, and the needs and expectations of the
participants in, the partnership and the close corporation, and the comparatively greater
vulnerability to oppression of the minority shareholder in the close corporation, the
Court held that all shareholders in close corporations owe one another a strict and
reciprocating fiduciary duty of "the utmost good faith and Foy all y . " 1 2 1
' OS Id. at 588-89, 328 N.E.2d at 513. For a good early discussion of the treatment in the United
States and Britain of oppression in close corporations, see O'Neal, Oppugnancy and Oppression in
Close Corporations: Remedies in America and in Britain, I B.C. Itvo. & COMM. L. REV. 1 (1959).
" 9 Id. at 589-91, 328 N.E.2d at 513-14.
"I Id. at 592, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
112 1d. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
bis Id. at 59!, 328 N.E.2d at 514.
"4 Id.
15 Id. at 589-90, 328 N.E.2d at 513-14.
116 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 108A, ** 31(1)(b), 31(2) (West 1970).
" 7 367 Mass. at 591-92, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 156B, § 100(a)(2)
(West 1970).
" 8 367 Mass. at 592, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
119 Id. at 592-93, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
' 99 Id. at 594, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)).
121 Id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (citing partnership fiduciary language from Cardullo v. Landau,
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C. The Progeny of Donahue
1, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.
In the 1976 case of Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, inc.,' 22 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that in terminating the employment of the plaintiff, Wilkes,
a minority shareholder, without a legitimate business purpose, the majority shareholders
had breached their duty of utmost good faith and loyalty.' 23 Wilkes, who had "a repu-
tation locally for profitable dealings in real estate,"'" entered into an agreement with
defendant T. Edward Quinn, defendant Leon L. Riche, and Dr. Hubert A. Pipkin to
purchase a building as a real estate investment.'" Wilkes, Quinn, Riche and Pipkin
incorporated the property under the name, "Springside Nursing Home, Inc.," to be
operated as a nursing home in which the four were equal shareholders. 126 Prior to their
incorporation, the four men entered into an agreement' 27 that each of them would: 1)
be a director of Springside Nursing Home, Inc.; 2) participate actively in corporate
decisionmaking and management; and 3) receive equal shares of money in return for
carrying out these responsibilities, as long as corporate resources permitted payment.' 23
Each of the four then assumed duties approximating one fourth of the total required to
operate the home, and each held various positions of corporate office.' 29
 Pipkin's interest
was transferred to defendant Lawrence T. Connor in 1959, 13" and was held by his estate
at the time of tria1. 131
The relationship between Wilkes and Quinn began to deteriorate in 1965 when
Wilkes convinced Riche and Connor to raise the price of a portion of the Springside
Nursing Home, Inc. which Quinn was negotiating to purchase for his independent
corporation.' 32 By January of 1967 Wilkes had fallen out with all three of the other men,
329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1952)). The breadth of the Donahue decision was forcefully
criticized by Justice Wilkins in his concurrence to the decision. Justice Wilkins expressed his concern
that this breadth of language implied too complete an analogy to partnership principles and thus
imperiled all operations of the corporation as they pertained to minority stockholders. See Donahue,
367 Mass. at 604, 328 N.E.2d at 521 (Wilkins, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Wilkins
stated:
I agree with much of what the Chief Justice says in support of granting relief to the
plaintiff. However, 1 do not join in any implication (see, e.g., footnote 18 and the
associated text) that the rule concerning a close corporation's purchase of a controlling
stockholder's shares applies to all operations of the corporation as they affect minority
stockholders. That broader issue, which is apt to arise in connection with salaries and
dividend policy, is not involved in this case. The analogy to partnerships may not he
a complete one.
Id. See also infra notes 225-36 and accompanying text.
' 22 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
1 " Id, at 852-53, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64.
124 Id. at 844, 353 N.E.2d at 659.
' 2, Id. at 843-44, 353 N.E.2d at 659.
126 Id. at 843-45, 353 N.E.2d at 659-60.
'" Id. at 845, 353 N.E.2d 660.
122 Id.
' 29 Id. at 845-46, 353 N.E.2d at 660.
' 50 Id. at 843 n.4, 353 N.E.2d at 659 n.4.
Id. at 843, 353 N.E.2d at 658-59.
' 3' Id. at 846, 353 N.E.2d at 660.
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and gave notice of his intention to sell his shares)" The next month the directors sat to
determine formally for the first time's' what the salaries of the officers and employees
of the corporation would be: Quinn was to receive a substantial raise; Riche and Connor
were to maintain their then current income;'" and Wilkes' name was omitted from the
list entirely.' 36 In March the annual shareholders' meeting was held in Wilkes' absence.'"
The meeting was attended by Wilkes' attorney, however, who held Wilkes' proxy vote,'"
Pursuant to a shareholder vote, Wilkes was informed that "neither his services nor his
presence at the nursing home was wanted by his associates."'" Furthermore, Wilkes was
denied reelection as either a director or an officer of the corporation) 4°
Wilkes filed suit in the Berkshire County Probate Court on August 5, 1971, seeking,
inter alia, declaratory judgments of the rights of the parties' 4 ' under an alleged pre-
incorporation partnership agreement entered into by Quinn, Riche, Pipkin and Wilkes,' 42
and portions of a stock transfer restriction agreement between the same four men. 143
Under a claim that these rights had been breached by the 1967 termination, against his
will, of his salary and positions of office, Wilkes filed a bill in equity, seeking declaratory
relief and restitutionary damages in an amount equal to that which he would have
received had his salary not been terminated.'" The suit was referred by a probate judge
to a master whose report was issued in 1973.' 45 In 1974 the Berkshire County Probate
Court confirmed the master's report over Wilkes' objections and dismissed Wilkes' action
on the merits. 146 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate
review in 1974.j 4 '
On appeal Wilkes pressed his argument that the alleged partnership agreement had
been breached, 148 and argued in the alternative that the defendants had breached the
fiduciary duty owed to him as the minority shareholder. 146 The court held that Wilkes'
severance was not the result of a legitimate termination for misconduct or neglect of
duties which the directors were empowered to effect.'" Rather, the court characterized
Wilkes' treatment as a "freeze-out" of a minority shareholder in a close corporation by
'" Id. at 846-47, 353 N.E.2d at 660-61.
134 This was the first exercise by the directors of their power under the corporate bylaws to set
salaries of officers and employees. Id. at 847 n.10, 353 N.E.2d at 661 n.10. Previously, all such
decisions were made by unanimous and informal apprOval. Id.
'" Id. at 846-47, 353 N.E.2d at 660-61. From 1955 until the meeting in February of 1967,
each of the directors of Springside Nursing Home, Inc. had received $100 per week. Id.
' 56 Id. at 847, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
'" Id. at 847 & 11.11, 353 N.E.2d at 661 & 11.11.
"8 Id.
139 Id. at 847, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
"° Id.
14 1 Id. at 843, 353 N.E.2d at 658.
148 Id. at 843 n.2, 353 N.E.2d at 658 u.2.
1 " Id.
144 Id. at 843, 353 N.E.2d at 659. Wilkes also sought other forms of relief. Id.
' 45 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id:
' 49 /d. at 843-44, 353 N.E.2d at 659. From the court's language in the decisions, it would
appear the Supreme judicial Court was the first tribunal to consider Wilkes' argument of fiduciary
breach.
' 58 Id. at 847, 849, 852, 353 N.E.2d at 661-64.
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the majority.' 5 ' The court held that in terminating Wilkes, the majority shareholders
had "breached their [Donahue] fiduciary duty to Wilkes as a minority shareholder • .."152
It was on this basis that the court awarded to Wilkes a monetary recovery from each of
his three fellow shareholders in the amount by which they had been "inequitably en-
riched."'"
In deciding Wilkes, however, the court, for the first time, established an analytical
procedure for suits brought by minority shareholders in a close corporation alleging a
breach of the Donahue fiduciary duty by the majority shareholders. 154 In essence, the
court adopted a legitimate business purpose defense, to be used by majority shareholders
against Donahue
- based claims.'" According to the court, when suit is brought against a
close corporation's control group, the group may demonstrate as an affirmative defense
that the action complained of was taken for a legitimate business purpose. 156 If the
purpose asserted is determined by the trier of fact to be legitimate, it is then open to
the complaining shareholder to rebut the defense by a showing that the same objective
could have been achieved via an alternative course of action less harmful to the plain-
tiff.'" If the plaintiff successfully demonstrates a "preferable" alternative, the court must
balance the "legitimate business purpose"' 58
 against the practicability of the "less harmful
alternative." 159 In Wilkes, this balancing was made unnecessary by the defendants' failure
to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose.' 6°
The Wilkes court established its legitimate business purpose test in acknowledgement
that the Donahue fiduciary duty to minority shareholders' 6 ' must he balanced against the
majority's need to have "room to maneuver" in directing the course of the corporation's
business,' 62
 and also in recognition of the majority's right to "selfish ownership.''I63 The
151 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 109-19 For a general discussion of freeze-outs; see
generally F.H. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.06, at 78-80 (1975); id. § 3.06,
at 27 (Supp. 1984).
132
 370 Mass. at 854, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
' 53
 Id. at 854, 353 N.E.2d at 665.
' 54 Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
' 35 Id. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663. The courts citations indicate that it adopted the legitimate
business purpose test not from Massachusetts precedent but from decisions in the federal courts
and in the state courts of other jurisdictions, and from legal commentators. Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d
at 663 (citing Bryan v, Brock & Blevins Co., 34'3 F. Supp. 1062, 1068 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff 'd, 490
F.2d 563, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 492, 335 N.E.2d 334, 338,
373 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (1975); Hancock, Minority Interests in Small Business Entities, 17 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 130, 132 (1968); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARV, L. REV. 1189, 1192-93, 1195-96, 1204 (1964); Comment, Recent Developments in the Law of
Corporate Freeze-Outs, 14 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 1252, 1256 (1973); Comment, Minority Rights
and the Corporate "Squeeze" and "Freeze", 1959 DUKE 436, 448, 458; Note, Freezing Out Minority
Shareholders, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1630, 1638 (1961); Note, Close Corporations — Bad Faith of Majority,
35 N.C.L. REV. 271, 273
-75 (1957); Symposium — The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345, 389
(1957); Comment, Corporate Freeze-Outs Effected by Merger: A Search for a Rule, 37 U. rm. L. REv.
115, 118 (1975); Comment, Minority Shareholders' Power to Compel Declaration of Dividends in Close
Corporations — A New Approach, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 723, 725, 735 (1956)).
1 '6 Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
157 Id. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2(1 at 663.
' 68 1d. at 852, 353 N.E.2(1 at 663.
L'" Id.
16" Id. at 852, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64.
' 6 ' Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
162 1d. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
' 63 Id. at 850-51, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63.
September 1985]	 ANTI-DONAHUE CLAUSE	 1229
court stated that in establishing analytical guidelines for Donahue-based claims it. sought
to avoid the "untempered application of the strict good faith standard enunciated in
Donahue . . . ." 1 " 1
The Wilkes case provided for the Donahue fiduciary duty those boundaries which
had previously been missing. Yet the decision also demonstrated the breadth of the
domain to which it applied, for Wilkes made clear that the intent of the Donahue court
had been more extensive than merely to establish an equal opportunity rule for the
repurchase of stock by a close corporation. Wilkes demonstrated an intent by the court,
within boundaries which protected the essential discretion of the control group, to
equitably protect the reasonable purposes of the close corporate shareholder from frus-
tration.'65 Thus, while Wilkes supplied some of the narrowing boundaries called for by
Justice Wilkins in his concurrence in Donahue, 166 the decision also expanded the equitable
protection afforded by the Donahue fiduciary duty beyond the domain of stock repur-
chases, so that it also protected a shareholder's reasonable expectation of continued
salaried employment as a return on his investment.''"
2. Post - Wilkes Progeny of Donahue
In Donahue and Wilkes, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, on the basis of
equitable considerations,'" set out and refined a heightened standard of fiduciary duty
among close corporate shareholders inter se. 16g An important element of this refinement
was the Wilkes rule, permitting the assertion of a legitimate business purpose defense, in
order that protection of close corporate shareholders would not overshadow the practical
requirements of a close corporation for legitimate control and maneuverability by the
majority.' 7" The court's reasoning in each of these cases was equitable in nature, as was
the injunctive remedy provided in Donahue"' and the restitutionary relief ordered in
Wilkes
After Wilkes, the case in which the Supreme judicial Court next relied on the Donahue
fiduciary standard was Jessie v. Boynton,'" which was decided in 1977. In Jessie, the
plaintiffs alleged that the directors and officers of the corporation had induced them,
through fraudulent. statements and omissions, to vote for their own disenfranchise-
ment.' 74 The court, citing the higher Donahue standard of fiduciary duty applicable to
close corporations, reversed the lower court's rejection of the plaintiffs' proposed
amended complaint. 175 The court held that the defendants' failure to disclose the creation
' 64 Id. at 850, 353 N.E.2d at 662.
165 Id. at 850, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63.
367 Mass. at 604, 328 N.E.2d at 521 (Wilkins, j., concurring). For the text of justice Wilkins'
concurrence, see supra note 121.
'" 370 Mass. at 845, 850. 353 N.E.2d at 659-60, 662,
168 See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 75-77, 102-21, 152-67 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
171 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 603-04, 328 N.E.2d at 521.
172 Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 854, 353 N.E.2d at 664-65.
173 372 Mass. 293, 361 N.E.2d 1267 (1977),
174 Id. at 294-303, 361 N.E.2d at 1268-73,
"5 Id. at 293-94, 304-05, 361 N.E.2d at 1268, 1273. The trial court held that the original
complaint failed to allege with sufficient particularity circumstances constituting fraud. Id. at 293—
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of a new class of nonvoting stock' 76 in proposed bylaws, at a meeting called to ratify
those bylaws, constituted a breach of the Donahue fiduciary duty, regardless of the
existence of actual fraud or even bad faith.'" The importance placed by the Jessie v.
Boynton court on the adequacy of disclosure is emphasized by their holding that the
plaintiffs had alleged a breach of the Donahue fiduciary duty despite the fact that all
procedures followed by the defendants, in proposing the bylaw changes, had been
proper.' 78 The holding is equitable in nature, in that it invalidates an act, which is in
every sense legally proper, on the basis of its unjust result.
One year later, in Pupecki v. James Madison Corp.,"' the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court again exercised its equity powers to impose a fiduciary duty among
shareholders in close corporations, which duty narrowed the legal rights of a majority
shareholder to cause the sale of corporate assets. 188 In Pupecki, the plaintiff brought a
derivative suit, claiming that the 90% shareholder, Fisher, had caused substantially all of
the assets of James Madison Corporation ( JMC) to be sold for less than fair value. 18 '
Although the suit was brought on behalf of the corporation, rather than Pupecki suing
Fisher personally, the court relied on Donahue and Wilkes to define the fiduciary duty of
Fisher towards JMC, of assuring the adequacy of the sale price of the assets. 182 This
requirement was imposed despite Fisher's statutoryl" right as majority shareholder to
cause the sale of the assets of JMC,' 84 and enabled Pupecki to pursue relief beyond his
statutory' 85 appraisal rights.' 88
In 1978 the Massachusetts Appeals Court decided Hallahan v. Haltom Corp.,'" citing
Donahue fiduciary principles as the basis for their decision to override a contractually
valid agreement where majority shareholders had utilized it to oppress minority share-
94, 361 N.E.2d at 1268. The judge permitted the plaintiffs twenty days within which to amend the
complaint, which they seasonably did. Id. The amended complaint was rejected by another superior
court judge who then dismissed the case. Id. The appeals court characterized the defendant's
argument as premised on a judge's ability to deny a motion to amend, where the proposed amended
complaint failed to state a claim. Id. at 294, 361 N.E.2d at 1269. On that basis, the Massachusetts
Supreme judicial Court analyzed the case in terms of the complaint as it was proposed to be
amended. Id.
"6 The plaintiffs fell within the class of members who by the creation of this stock would lose
their votes and thus by voting for the proposed bylaws, voted to disenfranchise themselves. Id. at
297, 361 N.E.2d at 1270.
"7 Id. at 303-04, 361 N.E.2d at 1273.
178 1d.
"" 376 Mass. 212, 382 N.E.2d 1030 (1978).
ISO Id. The court imposed the duty under the authority of Donahue and Wilkes, which are as
discussed supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text, decisions based on equitable considerations,
and which offered equitable relief. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
' 8 ' 376 Mass. at 213-14, 382 N.E.2d at 1031-32. Fisher apparently lost his enthusiasm for the
sale after its fruition, and joined with Pupecki in seeking its rescission to the extent of subrogating
his legal expenses. Id. at 219-20, 382 N.E.2d at 1034-35. The court discarded allegations of
champerty by the purchasers, Bretco, Inc., Bretco Associates, Harold N. Cotton and Robert M.
Bretholtz, who were also named as defendants. Id.
182 Id. at 216-17, 382 N.E.2d at 1033.
183 See Mass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 75 (West 1970).
,84 Id.
' 85 See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 98 (West 1970).
186 376 Mass, at 216-17, 382 N.E.2d at 1033.
187 7 Mass. App. Ct. 68, 385 N.E.2d 1033 (1979).
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holders.'" The facts of Hallahan are similar to those of Wilkes, in that the control group
fired a substantial minority group from their position of employment.'" In Hallahan two
pairs of brothers, the Hallahans and the Thompsons, had incorporated their joint
venture, an establishment called the Quarter Deck Lounge. 19" The four brothers in-
tended that they own the corporation as four equal shareholders, 19 ' but, in fact, they
issued themselves twenty-three and three quarters shares each,'" issuing the remaining
five shares to the Thompson brothers' cousin, David, as consideration for his carpentry
improvements to the establishment.'" The four agreed that David would have no active
participation in the corporation. David assigned his proxy to Charles Thompson indef-
initely and without apparent limitation.' 94 Four months after incorporation the Thomp-
son brothers called a meeting without notice of its purpose and, utilizing David's proxy,
fired the Hallahan brothers from their positions as bartenders.' 95
Although the brothers Hallahan had agreed to the issuance of five shares to David,
the court found that they had not envisioned the issuance as affecting their control
arrangement.'" It had been their intention and assumption that each pair of brothers
would exercise a one-half control over the corporation.' 97 Relying on the fiduciary
principles enunciated in Donahue and Wilkes, the trial court fashioned the unique equi-
table remedy of causing the return by David to the corporation of his five shares in
order to restore the equal division of control among the four shareholders.'" The
Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the decision to restore the balance of power initially
envisioned by the shareholders, because of the "generic similarity" between the fiduciary
duties owed by partners and by close corporate shareholders)"
Six years after the Donahue case, the Massachusetts Appeals Court decided Smith v.
Atlantic Properties, Inc., 200 giving vitality to the Donahue court's dictum that the strict
fiduciary duty ran not only from the majority to the minority, but also from the minority
toward the majority."' In Atlantic Properties the defendant, Dr. Louis E. Wolfson, was
one of four 25% shareholders in a close corporation which he had promoted." 2 Included
in the corporate charter at Wolfson's request was an 80% vote requirement clause, which
provided that in order for the corporation to take virtually any substantial action, an
80% majority vote was required."' Any combination of three shareholders commanded
only a 75% majority, and consequently the 80% vote requirement provided each of the
four 25% shareholders with a veto power."' Serious disagreements soon arose between
199 Id. at 70-71, 385 N.E.2d at 1034-35.
189 1d. at 69-70,385 N.E.2d at 1034.
' 9 " Id. at 69,385 N.E.2d at 1033-34.
' 9 ' Id. at 69, 385 N.E.2d at 1033.
192
	 at 69,385 N.E.2d at 1034.
1941d.
194 1d.
195 id ,
' 96 Id. at 69,71,385 N.E.2d at 1033, 1035.
' 97 1d. at 69,385 N.E.2d at 1033.
' 98 Id. at 70, 385 N.E.2d at 1034.
' 99 Id. at 71,385 N.E.2d at 1035.
200 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
201
	 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 593 n.17, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.17.
202 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 202, 422 N.E.2d at 799.
lei
2041d.
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Wolfson and the three shareholder majority:205
 During the course of these disagreements,
Wolfson, at least partly to avoid an increase in his own taxes, consistently refused to cast
his vote to enable the declaration of dividends. 200 He refused to acquiesce in the decla-
ration of dividends despite substantial corporate profits, 267 an increasingly excessive 2°H
accumulation of retained earnings, 209
 and warnings that failure to declare dividends
could incur penalty liabilities under the Internal Revenue Code. 21 ° Such penalties were,
in fact, incurred. 211
In defense of having permitted the accumulation of the retained earnings and of
having consistently vetoed dividend declarations, Wolfson attempted to invoke the Wilkes
legitimate business purpose test, stating that the corporate realty required repairs for
which the majority had refused to authorize expenditure. 212
 The trial court rejected this
contention that his purpose was thus legitimated by business needs, 2" finding that
Wolfson's true motivation rested on animosity and tax evasive intent. 2"
The Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed and upheld the decision of the trial
court. 2 " In considering Wolfson's actions, the appeals court found itself faced with "fa]
question ... concerning the extent to which , [a legal] power ... may be exercised as
its holder may wish, without a violation of the 'fiduciary duty — referred to in the Donahue
and Wilkes decisions, 216 The court noted that the 80% veto clause in the Atlantic Prop-
erties charter was a "sensible precaution" 217 and recognized that the clause was an
effective protection of Wolfson's minority interest. However, the court held that Wolfson
was bound to exercise his power under the veto provision in a manner consistent with
the Donahue duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty." 2" The court found that Wolfson's
consistent exercise of his veto power to the prejudice of the majority shareholders
constituted unreasonable conduct in violation of that duty. 2 ' 9
As it had in Hallahan, 22° the appeals court sanctioned an equitable remedy fashioned
by the trial court upon its finding of a violation of the Donahue duty by Wolfson, The
relief upheld by the appeals court included an injunction to declare dividends:22 ' The
remedy was applied to restrict a contractual right, Wolfson's veto power, where the
exercise of that right worked an injustice.
2°t' Id. at 203, 422 N.E.2d at 800.
2" Id. at 203-04, 422 N.E.2d at 800-01.
2"/(1. at 202, 422 N.E.2d at 799.
'"" Id. at 203, 422 N.E.2d at 800.
20" Id.
210 See 1.R.C. § 531 (1954).
2"
 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 203, 422 N.E.2d at 800. Wolfson, however, continued to disregard the
wishes of the 75% majority by voting against declaration of dividends. Id. Further penalties were
assessed. Id. at 204, 422 N.E.2d at 801.
212 Id. at 203-04, 209, 422 N.E.2d at 800-01, 803.
2 " Id. at 204, 422 N.E.2d at 801.
214 Id.
213 Id. at 209,422 N.E.2d at 803.
210 Id. at 207-08,422 N.E.2d at 802.
217 Id. at 207,422 N.E.2d at 802.
218 Id. at 209, 422 N.E.2d at 803.
210 Id.
22° 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 70, 385 N.E.2d at 1034. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
221 Properties, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 210, 422 N.E.2d at 803-04. The appeals court
modified the trial court's injunction. Id. That modification,. however, was for the purpose of in-
creasing the supervision of the corporation, not altering the underlying injunction., Id.
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3. Summary
In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
formalized a fiduciary standard which had previously been applied as an equitable
exception222
 to the general rule of Massachusetts law that mere ownership of stock
imposed no fiduciary duty among shareholders inter Se. 223 The sweeping breadth of this
change in the law was refined and affirmed by the court's decision in Wilkes, in which it
limited the Donahue duty by instituting a legitimate business purpose test. 224 In subse-
quent decisions the Massachusetts courts refined this new doctrine into a general limit
on the actions of all shareholders in a close corporation. Donahue and its progeny indicate
that actions by such a shareholder, while technically legal, may still be subject to regulation
by the courts under essentially equitable principles of justice and fairness.
11. THE ANTI-DONAHUE CLAUSE AS A RP:SPONSE TO DONAHUE
The dramatic changes in the law heralded by Donahue, of a new, stricter fiduciary
duty stirred a flurry of speculation by commentators, none of whom were quite sure just
what the court meant by "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive." 225 Authors
suggested that the "dangerous fiduciary obligation "22° and "hazardous dicta " 227 in the
case could mean the introduction of an active judicial role in such traditionally private
corporate concerns as "the direction of dividend ... decisions," 2" "determination of
salaries land the] hiring of employees" as well as in other areas of corporate decision
making.2" Authors surmised the abolition of formal corporate election requirements
and the abolition of the Massachusetts close corporation qua corporation for tax pur-
poses. 2" Some authors went so far as to suggest that the Donahue strict fiduciary duty
would also be applied to relatively larger corporations° "t and public corporations. 232
The concerns of these commentators were not unreasonable at the time that they
were voiced. They reflected, rather, a reasonable cautionary reaction to the sweeping
language of the Donahue decision and the court's specific declination to express any
opinion as to whether the strict fiduciary duty pertained to transactions among share-
holders where such transactions were unrelated to the corporation. 233 To at least some
extent this commentary was merely an amplified echo of the concerns voiced by Justice
Wilkins in his concurrence with Donahue."4
 Had the Supreme Judicial Court not heeded
such expressions of concern and refined the applicability of this new stricter duty in its
222 See supra notes 40-74 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 19-40 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 154-67 and accompanying text.
225 367 Mass. at 594, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (quoting Meinhard v, Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64,
164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)). See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
226 Villanova Note, supra note 12, at 315.
227 Id.
228 Harvard Note, supra note 12, at 431.
229 Villanova Note, supra note 12, at 317.
230 See, e.g., Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law Note, supra note 12, at 476.
25 ' See, e.g., Villanova Note, supra note 12, at 314-15.
252 Note, The Standard of Fiduciary Duty in a Close Corporation: Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, 61
IOWA L. Rev. 876, 898 (1976).
232 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 593 n.18, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.18.
2" See id. at 604, 328 N.E.2d at 521 (Wilkins, J., concurring). See also supra note 8 and accom-
panying text; see supra note 121.
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Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, /nc. 235 decision the following year, it is conceivable that
some of these potential extremes would have been realized. 236
The immediate response of the Massachusetts corporate bar to the Donahue decision
was one of moderate turmoil. 257 Attorneys sought to determine some basis by which to
measure the import of the decision to their clients. The primary concern expressed by
attorneys in the immediate wake of the Donahue decision was not that the effect of the
case on Massachusetts law was undesirable, but that it seemed not to be concretely
determinable. Lawyers found that their ability to predict the outcomes of hypothetical
corporate situations was restricted, and in consequence, so was their ability to confidently
plan an appropriate corporate structure to achieve a desired result. 238
It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty that many of Massachusetts' larger firms
with a significant corporate practice began to consider whether the Donahue decision
required a change in the standard forms they used in the incorporation of new busi-
nesses. Initially there was a fairly uniform movement among Massachusetts law firms to
draft some form of anti-Donahue clause, a legal device the sole purpose of which was to
modify or eliminate the new and apparently unpredictable element in corporate planning
which Donahue represented. 239 Two general categories of ADC emerged from these
efforts: those which are narrowly tailored to specific corporate practices, and those which
cover a broader spectrum of the Donahue duty. The most narrowly drawn ADC is
designed to do no more than to permit the corporation to pursue a single specific course
of action, which, in the absence of the ADC, would be proscribed by the Donahue fiduciary
duty. One plain example of a narrowly drawn ADC is that described by the Massachusetts
Supreme judicial Court in footnote twenty-four of the Donahue decision,"" in which all
shareholders give advance consent to arrangements permitting a corporate repurchase
of shareholder stock where the price offered is not to be extended to more than a single
235 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976). See supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
236 In Wilkes, the court verbalized its own recognition of the generative nature of Donahue,
stating that it was "concerned that untetnpered application of the strict ... [Donahue] standard ...
will result in the imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group in a close
corporation which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best
interests of all concerned." 370 Mass. at 850, 353 N.E.2d at 662. Wilkes was, in several respects, an
ideal case with which to demonstrate the breadth of the strict Donahue duty, and outline the
boundaries within which it was to be temperately applied. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying
text.
237
	 supra note 15 and accompanying text.
239
	
were raised that the duty would be applied not only to businesses organized and
incorporated in Massachusetts, but also to businesses whose principal place of business was in
Massachusetts, or to businesses which merely operated in Massachusetts. Massachusetts lawyers were
unsure what size a corporation had to be before its number of stockholders exceeded the Donahue
court's first criterion in defining a close corporation, that there be "a small number of stockholders."
See Donahue, 367 Mass at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511. Neither were most attorneys confident of' how
saleable a corporation's stock had to be, in order that its market might be considered "ready" and
thereby elude the court's second criterion. See id. Nor could any bright line test be perceived by
which to determine whether the participation of a corporation's majority stockholders in the
management of the corporation was insignificant enough to fall short of the last of the court's
criteria, that such participation be "substantial." See id.
"9 This movement toward drafting an anti-Donahue clause was echoed by the New England
Law Institute in its Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education.
"" 367 Mass. at 598 n.24, 328 N.E.2d at 518 m24.
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shareholder. 241 The second and more common type of ADC, however, is very broadly
drawn to uniformly preclude application of the Donahue fiduciary duty to any of a
corporation's actions. The broadly drawn ADC is framed in terms of the affairs of the
corporation generally, rather than in terms relating to a specific proposed action or type
of action. There are commonly two general parts to the broadly drawn, or blanket, ADC.
The first part states that the corporation shall be governed by the Massachusetts cor-
poration law, 242 and shall not be governed by partnership principles or any other obli-
gations of fiduciary duty not generally applicable to all corporations governed by Mas-
sachusetts General Laws, chapter 156B. Commonly appended to the blanket ADC is a
recitation denying that the factors used by the Donahue court to define a close corporation
shall be construed to define the business in question as a close corporation. The second
part of the blanket ADC generally consists of an amalgamation of narrow ADCs, stating
that: 1) the corporation shall be bound by no equal opportunity rule; 2) the ownership
of stock shall confer no right to election as a director or officer of the corporation; 3)
the ownership of stock shall confer no right to employment, salary, or the continuation
of either, except as otherwise provided by express agreement; and 4) the ownership of
stock shall confer no right to direct the amount of dividends or to require the declaration
of dividends.2 4 3
291 Id.
242 See MASS. GEN. Laws ANN. ch. 156B (West 1970).
245 It should be noted that these amalgamated narrow ADC provisions are derived from the
court's language in Donahue, see 367 Mass. at 588-89, 328 N.E.2d at 513 (quoting F.H. O'NEAL &
J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES 42 (1961)), and from Donahue's
progeny. The second and third would apply to the holding in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home,
Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976), that the defendants had violated their fiduciary duty
by denying office, salary and employment to the plaintiff. The fourth would answer to the holding
in Smith a. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981), that the defendant
had violated his Donahue fiduciary duty by the exercise of his veto power in regard to the declaration
of dividends.
Furthermore, the Wilkes court made clear in the language of its decision that judicial notice
had been taken of the importance that the control group have discretion in 1) the determination
of dividend policy; 2) the decision to merge or consolidate; 3) the determination of corporate
salaries; 4) the dismissal of directors with or without cause; and 5) the hiring and firing of corporate
employees. 370 Mass. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
The following arc examples of some of the anti-Donahue clause formats used by Massachusetts
firms.
ADC No. I
The affairs of the corporation shall not be governed by principles of partnership
law or fiduciary obligations between and among shareholders of close corporations,
except as they may be applicable generally to all corporations organized under Chapter
156B of the Massachusetts General Laws,
ADC No. II	 •
The affairs of the corporation shall not be governed by principles of partnership
law or fidudary obligations between and among shareholders of close corporations,
except as they may be applicable generally to all corporations organized under Chapter
156B of the Massachusetts General Laws. The corporation may purchase or otherwise
acquire shares of its capital stock from one or more shareholders and may issue, sell
or otherwise transfer shares to one or more persons without purchasing or otherwise
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The uniformity among Massachusetts law firms ended at the fact and manner of
drafting some sort of disclaimer in response to the Donahue decision. Some firms included
ADCs as a matter of course in some of their draft articles of organization or bylaws.
Others formulated ADCs as shareholder agreements separate from the corporate or-
ganizational documents. Still other firms simply decided not to use them at all, because
acquiring shares from or issuing, selling, or otherwise transferring shares to any other
persons.
ADC No. III
Subject to the provisions of Chapter 156B of the Massachusetts General Laws, no
special rights or duties among the shareholders inter se or between any shareholder
and the corporation shall arise by virtue of the number of shareholders of the cor-
poration, the absence of a ready market for the sale of its capital stock or the existence
of shareholder participation in the management of the corporation. In furtherance,
and not in limitation of the foregoing:
1•	 The corporation may purchase or redeem shares of its capital stock from
any purchaser without offering other shareholders an equal opportunity to have
their shares purchased or redeemed by the corporation;
2. The status of shareholder of the corporation shall confer no right to be
elected a director of the corporation;
3. Except as otherwise provided by written agreement, the status of share-
holder of the corporation shall confer no right to be employed by the corporation
in any capacity or to receive any salary from the corporation or, in the event that
such employment should exist or such salary should be paid, the status of the
shareholder of the corporation shall confer no right to the continuation of such
employment or salary; and
4. The Board of Directors of the corporation shall have full and absolute
discretion to determine whether to declare dividends upon the capital stock of
the corporation from funds legally available therefor or to refrain from declaring
such dividends; the status of shareholder of the corporation shall confer no right
to require that any dividend be declared.
ADC No. IV
The relationship of investors in stock and debt securities of the corporation is
that of a shareholder of a corporation in the case of holders of the corporation's stock,
and a creditor of a corporation in the case of a holder of debt securities of the
corporation, with their rights and obligations being determined by the articles of
organization of the corporation, its bylaws, the Business Corporation Law as in effect
from time to time, and any agreement with respect thereto that they may enter into
with the corporation; their relationship is not that of partners and no holder of debt
securities of the corporation or holder of stock of the corporation has the fiduciary
obligation of a partner to any other such holder. Without limiting the generality of
the foregoing:
I.	 no such investor or holder shall, by reason of holding or having held stock
or debt securities of the corporation, have any right to payment of any moneys
(sic) from the corporation or to receive any other property, benefits or rights from
the corporation, other than the payment of interest and principal on the debt
securities of the corporation, the payment of dividends on the stock when as and
if declared by the directors of the corporation, the payment from the corporation
for Common Stock purchased pursuant to Article — hereof, and the right to
receive his pro rata share of the net assets of the corporation in liquidation;
2.	 nor shall any such investor or holder have any right to (or to continue in)
any office, employment or business relationship with the corporation on account
of holding or having held any stock or debt securities of the corporation, not-
withstanding that one or more other investors or holders may be appointed to
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they were undesirable or because they felt that the ADCs would not be upheld by the
courts. A few firms felt that a fiduciary duty could not be affected by contract language.
Today, the firms appear fairly evenly divided in their use of ADCs, between those who
continue to use them, and those who feel that the ADC is either not useful or effective.
ADCs are now generally used not as a matter of course, but rather under specific
circumstances in which one or more shareholders desires to avoid one or more aspects
of the Donahue duty.
III. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AS AN ANALYTIC STANDARD BY WHICH TO DETERMINE
TILE EFFICACY OF THE ANTI-DONAHUE CLAUSE
A. Reasonable Expectations
The use of ADCs by the Massachusetts corporate bar raises the question of their
legal efficacy. ADCs themselves represent contracts, some of which are presumably valid.
Certain ADCs, however, probably seek to effect a result inconsistent with the principles
enunciated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Donahue. As this note has
demonstrated, the Donahue line of cases has developed along equitable lines, with the
actions of all shareholders in a close corporation being measured against a standard of
utmost good faith and loyalty, as balanced by legitimate business objectives."' In effect,
analysis under Donahue and its progeny devolves into an attempt to identify and protect
the reasonable expectations of close corporate shareholders, an exercise of equity. 245 It
follows that these ADCs would be contrary to the principles of Donahue where they serve
to frustrate those expectations, and may therefore be unenforceable, if not reformable,
under the equity powei's of the courts.
The question of equitable enforceability of an otherwise valid contractual provision
is not raised here for the first time. In Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 246 the Massachusetts
Appeals Court examined the extent to which a contractual right could be exercised
without violating a fiduciary duty."' In that case the appeals court held that the defen-
dant Wolfson's right to veto corpor'ate actions was bounded by his partner-like fiduciary
duty. 298 Had the court found the provisions granting Wolfson his veto power to be
(or hold) an office, employment or a business relationship with the corporation;
and
3.	 nor shall any such investor or holder have any right to compel the corpo-
ration, nor shall the corporation be obligated, to purchase shares of stock or other
securities of the corporation or other property from him (except as provided in
Article _) or to sell stock, other securities of the corporation or other property
hint, notwithstanding that the corporation shall have purchased or sold or
offered to purchase or sell stock, other securities of the corporation or other
property from or to one or more other investors or holders at any price.
These represent but a few examples of the ADC. Many of Boston's larger law firms have
drafted a plethora of variations of this theme. Even among the firms which do not utilize ADCs as
a matter of course, there are likely to be a few drafts of these or similar clauses which the attorneys
consider using from time to time. In the following section there will be a discussion of the probable
efficacy of these clauses in light of the nature and purpose of the Donahue duty.
244 See supra notes 1-223 and accompanying text.
245 See infra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
246 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201,422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
247 Id. at 207-08,422 N.E.2d at 802.
24 ' Id. at 208-09,422 N.E.2d at 802-03.
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contractually deficient, presumably the court's inquiry would have ended there. It did
not. Rather, the court tacitly accepted the contract represented by the 80% provisions,
and considered the extent to which that valid contractual right could be exercised, before
equity demanded its curtailment. 249 In considering this question, the court also stressed
the importance of considering all of the "relevant circumstances" of the case. 250 The
court described Wolfson's refusal to declare dividends as objectively unreasonable and
"inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation" 25 ' of his Donahue duty. 252
According to the reasoning of the Atlantic Properties court, a court of equity may
seek to determine whether intervention is warranted in order to protect the reasonable
expectations of the parties involved. The existence of the veto provisions in the Atlantic
Properties articles of organization is evidence that the shareholders expected that each
would have a veto power, and yet it is equally evident that in the judgment of the court
the plaintiffs reasonably believed that Wolfson would not exercise that power in the
oppressive manner in which he did.
The Atlantic Properties court's methodology is entirely in accord with the evolution
of the Donahue duty. The Donahue court emphasized that it was not only the similarity
between close corporations and partnerships which warranted holding shareholders inter
se to the stricter partnership fiduciary duty. 253 The court noted that, to an even greater
degree than partners, close corporate shareholders are peculiarly vulnerable to oppres-
sive tactics 254 which could result in their being "trapped in a disadvantageous position" 255
or even being forced to abandon their interest by being frozen oUt. 256 Thus, as a contract
entered into in a close corporate setting, an ADC will be subject to an analytic scrutiny
similar to that employed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court in Atlantic Properties.
The purported 'goal behind the use of an ADC is to maintain the contractual
flexibility inherent in corporations; and yet in a pragmatic sense the goal of an ADC is
to imbue one or more of the shareholders, or the corporation, with particular power.
An ADC may give the power to pursue a legitimate and minutely defined course of
action, or it may give the power to select and execute any of several methods of "freezing
out." 2" Working within the parameters defined by the Donahue court, the latter purpose
is an impermissible exercise of oppressive conduct, 258 while the former is probably
entirely acceptable.259 This potentially conflicting position is a tenable one only to the
extent that definitions, which are succinct enough to adequately differentiate these two
purposes, can be formulated.
249 The court described Wolfson's right to withhold his vote under the provisions in the articles
and bylaws requiring an 80% vote for shareholder action (the 80% provisions), id. at 202, 206-07,
422 N.E.2d at 799, 802, as a "sensible precaution," id. at 207, 422 N.E.2d at 802, and as a "veto
power." Id. at 208, 422 N.E.2d at 802. See supra notes 200-19 and accompanying text.
25° 12 Mass, App. Ct. at 209, 422 N.E.2d at 803.
2" Id.
252 Id.
2" See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 588-92, 328 N.E.2d at 513-15.
"4 Id. at 592, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
255
256 Id.
2" Id. at 588, 328 N.E.2d at 513. For a discussion of "freeze-outs," see Note, Freezing Out
Minority Shareholders, supra note 155, at 1630-34; also see generally F.H. O'NEAL, supra note 151,
§§ 3-7.
259
	 Donahue at 588-92, 328 N.E.2d at 513-15.
259 Id. at 598 n.24, 328 N.E.2d at 518 n.24.
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The Donahue court referred to "freeze-outs -2" as "oppressive devices ,"26I quoting
extensively from Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates by F.H. O'Neal and J.
Derwin,262 but did not offer finite guidance as to precisely what actions by corporations
or shareholders would constitute oppression. Professor O'Neal, whose work the Donahue
court described as "authoritative," 2" has promulgated a useful definition of oppression
in the close corporate context as "exercise by ... controlling shareholders of powers
given them by ... the company's charter in a way that unfairly prejudices minority
shareholders or disappoints their reasonable expectations ... . "264 Other commentators
have described oppression in similar terms,265 but O'Neal's definition has won the im-
primatur of courts266 and legislatures. 267
The reasonable expectations rule is an equitable doctrine 2" similar to the equitable
doctrine of trust and confidence generally associated with fiducial relations 269 and par-
ticularly associated with the partner-like fiduciary duty applied by the Donahue court. 27°
The reasonable expectations rule is also tied to traditional contract law, to the extent
that in an examination of a contract courts seek to determine what the contracting parties
contemplated. 271
The Donahue court did not use the words "reasonable expectations," but the court's
language is clearly couched in terms of' equity and its analysis is framed in terms of the
reasonable expectations of the shareholders. 272 The court's application of principles of
partnership law to the close corporation, moreover, signals an invocation of those equi-
table doctrines associated with the partnership duty. 275 The equitable nature of the
Donahue duty is further exemplified by the application in Wilkes of the restitutionary
theory of "inequitable enrichment." 274 Finally, as this note has demonstrated, the duty
26° Id. at. 588, 328 N.E.2d at 513.
261 Id,
262 Id. at 588-89, 328 N.E.2d at 513 (quoting F.H. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRES-
SION OF BUSINESS AssomATEs 42 (1961)).
268 Id. at 588, 328 N.E.2d at 513.
264 O'Neal, Recommended Reform, supra note 11, at 886. O'Neal cites the United Kingdom case,
Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd., [1973] A.G. 360, 379 (1972), [1972] 2 W.L.R. 1289, [1972]
2 All E.R. 492, rev'g In re Westbourne Galleries, Ltd. [1971] Ch. 799, as authority for this definition.
O'Neal, Recommended Reform, supra 'tote 11, at 886. See also infra notes 277-310 and accompanying
text.
262 See, e.g., Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for Reform,
55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1064 (1969), and sources cited therein.
266 See, e.g., O'Donnel v. Marine Repair Services, Inc., 530 F. Supp, 1199, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So, 2d 1038, 1039 (Miss. 1980); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson
Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 152-55, 400 A.2d 554, 559-61 (1979); Bolstein v. Gimpel Farms,
Inc,, 125 Misc. 2d 45, 50, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Topper v. Park Sheraton
Pharmacy, Inc., 107 Misc. 2d 25, 32-33, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364-65 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (analyzing the
legislative history of N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAIN § 1104(a) (McKinney 1963), and finding an intent to
adopt O'Neal's definition); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 290, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (1983).
267 Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc., 107 Misc. 2d 25, 33, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364-65
(Sup. Ct. 1980).
268 F.H. O'NEAL, supra note 151, § 7.15 at 329 8c.n.6.5 (Supp. 1984).
268 See, e.g., BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (3d ed. 1969).
2" See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 592-93, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
27I
	
E. FARNswoRTH, CONTRACTS §§ 3.6-3.8 (1982).
272 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 591, 598 n.24, 328 N.E.2d at 514, 518 n.24.
2" See id. at 597, 328 N.E.2d at 517.
274 See Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 854, 353 N.E.2d at 665.
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announced by the Donahue court derives from a line of equitable decisions 275 and has
developed into an equitable analysis designed to protect, through equity, the reasonable
expectations of all close corporate shareholders. 276
 It follows that evaluation of the
validity of an ADC will turn upon a court's finding of whether the ADC reflects the
reasonable expectations of all of the parties to the agreement in which it is included.
The history of post-Donahue jurisprudence in Massachusetts indicates that where an ADC
does not reflect such expectations, or where oppressive actions taken by shareholders
under the auspices of an ADC are contrary to such expectations, a court will implement
corrective measures from the full range of remedies available to a complaining share-
holder in a court of equity.
B. The Commonwealth Countries' Utilization of Reasonable Expectations in the Partnership
Analogy
The law of the Commonwealth countries 277 provides useful precedent for application
of an express reasonable expectations standard to corporate agreements such as an
ADC. 278
 The Commonwealth countries have long adopted the reasonable expectations
of the parties as the standard for equitable evaluation of the actions of partners, joint
venturers and shareholders in private companies. 27" Commonwealth countries cases
employing a reasonable expectations analysis have been relied on or cited by numerous
state courts in the United States to identify the nature of the relationship among persons
in these contexts. 2"
The 1905 Scottish case, Symington v. Symington's Quarries, Ltd., 281 set influential prec-
edent in the employment of a reasonable expectations standard for evaluating the actions
of shareholders in private companies. 282
 In that case the session court found the private
company there under consideration to be similar to a partnership 2" and on that basis
found it to be Just and equitable"284 to grant dissolution when the petitioners demon-
275 See supra notes 41-74 and accompanying text.
"" See supra notes 122-221 and accompanying text.
277 The Commonwealth countries include England and Scotland (as members of the United
Kingdom), and Australia among others. D.M. WALKER, OXFORD COMPANION TO THE LAw 255 (5th
ed. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as OXFORD ComPANaoN To THE LAw]. Although there is no body
of Commonwealth law per se, there are a great number of elements of law which are common to
the legal systems of these countries which arc members of the Commonwealth. Id. at 257.
278 See, e.g., Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries, [1973] A.C. 360 (1972).
The rationale for considering United Kingdom case law in this regard has been recognized by the
courts, for example in their citation to the United Kingdom case, Scottish Wholesale Society, Ltd.
v. Meyer, [1959) A.C. 324, 361 (Scot. 1958). See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 351,
358 & n.4 (Mo. App. 1976); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 152,
400 A.2d 554, 560 (1979); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 628-29 & n.9,
507 13 ,2d 387, 393-94 & n.9 (1973); White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972).
278 See Symington v. Symington's Quarries, Ltd., 1905-06 Sess. Cas. 121 (Scot. 1st Div. 1905).
280 See supra note 278 and sources cited therein.
281
 1905-06 Sess. Cas. at 121.
682 See, e.g., Weslbourne Galleries, [1973] A.G. 360, 375 (Lord Wilberforce).
283 Symington, 1905-06 Sess. Cas. at 130 (Lord M'Laren).
294
	 (construing the 'just and equitable" clause of the United Kingdom Companies Act, 1862,
25 & 26 Via. ch. 89, § 79(5), which reads, "A company under this Act may be wound up by the
Court . . . (5) whenever the Court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should
be wound up").
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strated to the satisfaction of the court that the controlling shareholder/director had
"persistently defied [their] views." 285 Symington may have marked the beginning of the
application of sonic form of equitable reasonable expectations doctrine to cases involving
oppression in close corporations. A line of cases flowing from Symington demonstrates
the effect of contract on an equitable consideration of oppression in close corporations.
In re Straw Products Pty., Ltd., 2" a case decided by the Supreme Court of Victoria,
Australia in 1942, cited to the Symington case as support for the proposition that a close
corporation is analogous to a partnership:437 The corporation at issue was comprised of
five shareholders. 2" Irwin Hinds was the governing director and controlling share-
holder.289 Hinds denied the petitioner, E.C. Robertson, a shareholder and director, access
to the company books. 290 Hinds also consistently refused to declare reasonable
dividends2" and concurrently loaned large unsecured sums of money to another com-
pany under his control, against petitioner's protests.292
In analyzing the relative position of the parties, the Straw Products court equated
Robertson's ability to sell his shares to retiring from a partnership, and noted that
Robertson could not do so "except at the will of Hinds and at Hinds' own price." 293
Chief Justice Mann then analyzed the case as follows:
All that Hinds has done in the past in exercise of his control has been
within his legal powers. The question is whether he has used these powers
in such a way as to make it just and equitable that Robertson should be
allowed by the Court to retire from the partnership. The analogy of a part-
nership seems to me to clarify discussion.294
On these grounds the court held that considerations of justice and equity served as a
boundary to Hinds' contractual rights under the terms of the company's charter to either
refuse to purchase Robertson's shares or to undervalue them, and consequently, the
order of the court below to wind up the company was affirrned. 295 The similarity of the
Straw Products court's logic to that of the Ai/antic Properties court is remarkable. In each
case the court used its equity powers to restrict a contractual right where the exercise of
that right worked an injustice. 296
The rationale of the Australian court's logic in Straw Products was followed and
elaborated upon nine years later in another Australian case, In re Wondoflex Textiles Pty.,
Ltd."' In Wondoflex, the controlling shareholders were a father and son whom, the court
found, had devised a nefarious scheme to humiliate and financially embarass the unre-
2" Symington, 1905-06 Sess. Cas. at 124.
286
 In re Straw Products Pty. Ltd., 119421 V.L.R. 222.
2" Id. at 223.
286 Id. at 227.
289 Id.
29° Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 223.
294 Id. (emphasis in original) (applying the 'just and equitable" clause of the Victorian Com-
panies Act, 1938, § 166(1)(f), 3 Geo. VI § 4602 (comparable to the Scottish "just and equitable"
clause supra at note 284)).
2"5 Id. at 238.
296 But see supra notes 200-21 and accompanying text.
297 [1951] V.L.R. 458.
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lated minority shareholder into selling his shares at a grossly undervalued price. 298 The
Wondoffex court noted two general principles of law which govern the arena of equitable
dissolution. 2" The first principle was the analogy to partnership, relied on by the Sym-
ington court for companies with a limited number of shareholders and the consequently
stricter duty of trust and confidence which that analogy implies."° The second and
related principle was that of lost confidence, 901 whereby a court may grant - dissolution
of a private company when a petitioner successfully demonstrates the existence of a
situation "entirely outside what was intended by the parties concerned when the peti-
tioner joined the company."302 According to the Wondoflex court, the second rule was
more stringently applied if under the first principle a company were deemed analogous
to a partnership. 3 °3 The court further observed that the equitable principle would obtain
even where the actions complained of were technically legal and consistent with the
express terms of the agreement of the parties." 4 In granting a petition for equitable
dissolution, the Wondoflex court emphasized the contemplations and assumptions of the
shareholders at the outset 3 D3 of their corporate venture.
The Wondoflex court's analysis relied on precepts promulgated by the English House
of Lords in the 1942 case of Loch v. John Blackwood, Ltd. 3" In Loch, the House of Lords
restored the winding-up order of the Court of Common Pleas of Barbados, on the
grounds that the controlling shareholder had proposed to purchase all of the minority
shares held by two families for a grossly insufficient price." 7 An integral part of this
scheme, the court found, was to dupe a widow into acting as the controlling shareholder's
agent to bilk her fellow minority shareholder.309 Loch is taken to stand for the broader
principle of breached expectations, referred to by the courts of the Commonwealth
countries as the doctrine of lost confidence, which constitutes grounds for winding up a
corporation on the basis of unconscionability, even without the supporting analogy to
partnership. 309
398
	 at 462,468-69.
199 Id. at 465.
"0 Id.
301 Id.
m Id. at 463.
3°3 Id. at 465.
" As the Wondoflex court stated, in terms reminiscent of the reasoning of the Massachusetts
Appeals Court in Atlantic Properties:
[E]ven when there has been nothing done in excess of power it is necessary to consider
whether the situation which has arisen is not quite outside what the parties contem-
plated by the arrangements they entered into, and whether what has been done is not
contrary to the assumptions which were the foundation of their agreement.
Id. at 467.
305 Id.
3°5
 [1924] A.G. 783 (P.C.) (W. Ind. Ct. App. (Barbados)).
so7 Id. at 795-96.
", Id. at 796. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline summed up the case there at hand as follows: "Their
Lordships do not care to characterize these suggestions in the language which perhaps they fully
deserve .... No confidence in the directorate could survive such a proposal." Id.
3°9 Wondoflex, [195]] V.L.R. at 465. An earlier case, In re Yenidje Tobacco Company, Ltd.,
[1916] 2 Ch. 426, relied on by both the Loch and Wondoflex courts, used the partnership analogy to
support a finding of justifiable lost confidence. See Yenidje Tobacco Company, [1916] 2 Ch. at 432.
Again, in so doing, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Cozens-Hardy, relied upon an analysis of present
circumstances in contrast with the original contemplations of the parties. Id. He emphasized that
September 1985] 	 ANTI-DONAHUE CLAUSE	 1243
It is thus evident that the law of the Commonwealth countries looks closely at the
expectations of close corporate shareholders, due in part to a perceived similarity be-
tween private companies and partnerships, to determine an appropriate disposition of
discord among the participants in a venture. In so doing, the Commonwealth countries
courts look both to the initial intentions of the parties, and their contemporaneous
expectations of treatment. Based upon a determination shaped by the extent to which
these expectations are reasonable, the Commonwealth countries courts then formulate
a resolution to the discord, using their powers of equity. The analysis used, of analogizing
close corporations to partnerships and in consequence imposing a stricter fiduciary duty,
is remarkable in its similarity to the equitable considerations which formed the bases of
the reasoning and decisions in the Donahue line of cases. 51°
C. An Analysis of the Efficacy of the Anti- Donahue Clause
An analogy between the close corporation and the partnership has evolved in both
the United States and the Commonwealth countries. That analogy carries with it the
principle that the strict fiduciary duty of partners inter se should be applied to the relations
between close corporate shareholders."' The evolution of this duty in the close corpo=
ration context represents the intention of both the American and Commonwealth courts,
acting in equity, to protect the reasonable expectations of shareholders in close corpo-
rations.
Implicit in the partnership analogy is an understanding that close corporate share-
holders in general reasonably believe that they are in a partnership-like relationship with
their fellow shareholders. That is not to say that the close corporate shareholder is
laboring under an erroneous assumption that he has entered into a partnership agree-
ment rather than incorporating. Rather, he reasonably holds out the hope that the
relationship into which he has entered with his fellow shareholders has certain attributes
which are partnership-like in nature." 2
The fact of incorporation does little to alter the assumption of typical close corporate
shareholders that regardless of the corporate facade which they present to the world
they will act as partners inter se.'" This is often demonstrated in a close corporation's
charter, bylaws and shareholder agreements, which typically reflect an effort to obtain a
number of partnership attributes. 3 "
the company's outright commercial success was no answer to the petitioner's request for winding
up on the grounds of lost confidence. Id.
3 " See supra notes 41-224 and accompanying text.
'" See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 594, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, CT)); see also id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (citing
partnership fiduciary language from Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845
(1952)).
312 The attributes referred to here are not at all limited to the formal structural characteristics
which typify a partnership or a corporation. They include also those less tangible qualities which
are of at least equal import: qualities of trust, confidence, loyalty and utmost good faith. Taken
together, these attributes create an expectation that no action will be taken which favors an individual
shareholder or group of shareholders to the detriment or exclusion of any of their fellow share-
holders.
313 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, LAW & PRACTICE § 1.07 at 21 (1st ed. 1975) [hereinafter
referred to as F.H. O'NEm.„ CLOSE CORPORATIONS].
5 " Id. These efforts include such devices as supermajority voting requirements and veto pro-
visions. id.
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There generally is, however, no corresponding written embodiment of a sharehold-
er's expectations of the intangible qualities of his relationship with his fellow sharehold-
ers, such as trust and loyalty. It is in recognition of the unspoken nature of these
legitimate expectations that the courts discussed have imposed a partnership-like fidu-
ciary duty among close corporate shareholders. While the Commonwealth countries have
exercised their powers in equity under the authority of the Companies Act, 3 n the Donahue
line of cases demonstrates the evolution of a similar equitable principle in the common
law, in derogation of the prior common law rule that shareholders bore no fiduciary
duty inter se by virtue of the mere ownership of stock.316 Where, as in Massachusetts,
courts had specifically recognized that the common law held shareholders free of any
fiduciary duty, they acted in equity to impose such a duty, in order to protect the
reasonable expectations of close corporate shareholders. 30 The breadth of this evolution
in the United States and throughout the Commonwealth countries towards protecting
close corporate shareholders, lends a tenacious power and legitimacy to that protection.
Any analysis of the legal efficacy of the ADC must perforce be consistent with the
Donahue doctrine as currently developing under Massachusetts law. As this note has
shown, Donahue and its progeny operate to impose a rule of equity protecting the
reasonable expectations of close corporate shareholders. 3 ' 8 It follows that analysis of an
ADC must also turn on the effect of the ADC on the reasonable expectations of the
close corporate shareholder at the outset of the corporate venture."
The following two-tiered test is a method of analysis through which to consider the
efficacy of an ADC. Under the first tier a court should consider the contractual validity
of an ADC. This level of the analysis would include standard considerations and would
concern fairly uniform and fundamental legal issues which surround contractual agree-
ments, such as adequacy of consent and disclosure.") Under the second tier, which
comprises the heart of the test, a court should inquire into the effect which a valid
contract may have on the Donahue genre of fiduciary duty, as defined by a shareholder's
reasonable expectations.
Thus, when confronted with an attack on the validity of an ADC, a court should
first examine the ADC in light of traditional defenses to contract. If, for example, the
ADC is unsupported by adequate consideration, or is the result of fraud, the ADC will
of course not stand.32 ' If, on the other hand, the contract is free from formal or general
315 See, e.g., the 'just and equitable" clause of the Victorian Companies Act, 1938, 1'3 166(1)(f),
3 Geo. VI § 4602.
31 " See supra notes 25-90 and accompanying text.
317 See supra notes 106-229,245-76 and accompanying text.
'JIB Id.
519 See supra notes 311-18 and accompanying text.
120 Accordingly, this tier of analysis will not be discussed in this note in any but the most
elementary terms.
921 Inquiry would end upon a determination of contractual invalidity of the ADC, presumably
resolving the litigation in favor of the plaintiff, if the ADC at issue itself granted the defendant the
enabling power to exercise the complained of action. Conversely, if that power is unquestionably
granted elsewhere and the ADC was claimed to represent the plaintiff's acquiescence in the specific
result of that action, the court should proceed to the second tier of inquiry.
Generally, courts should reach the second stage of analysis only if the ADC is valid contractually.
Ironically, however, depending on the nature of the relation between the action complained of and
the ADC, it is conceivable that the second stage of analysis proposed here may be reached even in
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equitable defects, the fact of its validity should prove to be only the first step in a court's
analysis.
At the second tier of inquiry, given the nature and purpose of the Donahue duty,"22
the trier of fact should conduct its analysis under the equitable doctrine of reasonable
expectations.'23 Courts should therefore predicate their analysis of the efficacy of a valid
ADC in the second tier upon a realistic assessment of the extent to which the ADC has
actually altered the shareholder's reasonable expectations that the relationship among
shareholders inter se would be marked by the trust and loyalty expectations of partner-
ships. 324 The policy foundation upon which the Donahue fiduciary duty is based dictates
that the close corporate shareholder be presumed to harbor such expectations.'" The
Donahue defendant should bear the burden of rebutting that presumption. The defen-
dant may rebut the presumption by presenting the court with a valid contractual agree-
ment in the form of an ADC to which the plaintiff is a party and in which the plaintiff
disclaims the existence of precisely those expectations which Donahue requires the court
to presume.
Mere presentation of an ADC, however, will not end the inquiry. The court must
finally proceed to determine if the disclaimer embodied by the ADC in fact expressed
the true intent and understanding of the plaintiff signatories at the time of making the
agreement." 26 One of the integral factors that a court should look to in determining
whether there is a valid contractual disclaimer is the comprehensibility of the ADC.
Given the presumed existence of a shareholder's legitimate assumption that he and his
fellow shareholders are bound by utmost good faith and a loyalty to the enterprise as a
whole which supersedes each shareholder's "avarice" and "self-interest," the ADC should
be held to a stringent standard of comprehensibility to the extent that it purports to
diminish that intangible quality of trust. In this regard such factors as the candor and
simplicity of an ADC should be important factors in the court's evaluation. These would
the event that the trier of fact determines the ADC to be contractually invalid. This would depend
upon whether the ADC at issue were perceived as the enabling source of the defendant's power to
commit the act complained of by the plaintiff shareholder. In this respect, the form of the analysis
of a claimed fiduciary breach should be one and the same, whether in the absence or presence of
an ADC. If it is conducted in the presence of an ADC, the method of analysis should be a constant,
regardless of the ADC's contractual validity, except insofar as such invalidity, as discussed above,
has already given the court cause to end its inquiry. However, in the event that the court has
adjudged an ADC to be contractually invalid, the effect which that ADC will have in the second,
equitable tier of inquiry should presumably be de rninimis. Therefore, in the interest of simplicity,
ADCs which are contractually invalid but do not preclude the court's reaching the second stage of
analysis will be classed with the general structural enabling provisions which grant a defendant the
legal power to perform the action from or for which the plaintiff is seeking relief. Examples of
these latter provisions would include the veto power considered in Atlantic Properties, see supra notes
200-21 and accompanying text, or a section from the articles of organization or bylaws which
granted the power to remove an officer or fire an employee. Essentially, this latter category of
invalid ADC will be classed with those cases in which no ADC exists, cases which are considered
here merely as a measure of comparison, in order to illustrate the effect which a valid ADC might
have if examined under the test proposed here.
"2 See supra notes 106-224, 253-312 and accompanying text.
523 See supra notes 311-19 and accompanying text.
"4 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id.
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become particularly pertinent in the case of a less sophisticated plaintiff, or one who is
inexperienced in the corporate arena."'
Considerations of comprehensibility and fairness of presentation will frequently lend
greater credence to a narrowly drawn ADC 328 than to a blanket ADC. 329 The logic of
fulfilling expectations which are carefully and comprehensively enunciated in share-
holder agreements was clearly recognized by the Donahue court in footnote 24 of that
decision, where the court stated:
Of course, a close corporation may purchase shares from one shareholder
without offering the others an equal opportunity if all other shareholders
give advance consent to the stock purchase arrangements through acceptance
of an appropriate provision in the articles of organization,.the corporate by-
laws ... , or a shareholder's agreement 550
In light of this language, it could be strongly argued that the Donahue court had no
intention of restricting the potential flexibility of the close corporation available through
the vehicle of shareholder agreements. Rather, the court sought to ensure that when
that flexibility was exercised, it was done with the full and meaningful consent of all
concerned, rather than being exercised at the expense of the peculiarly vulnerable close
corporate shareholder.33 ' This reading of the court's intent is consistent with the equitable
nature of the Donahue opinion, 332 and with the emphasis on preservation of the reason-
able expectations of shareholders which permeates both the precedent on which Donahue
is based"' and the cases which Donahue has spawned. 334
The Donahue court's suggestion that shareholders may freely contract away their
duties inter se, if untempered by a reasonable expectations standard, would yield the
result reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in its recent
decision of Coleman v. Taub. 335 In Coleman the court held that a plaintiff bargained away
his right to expect continued corporate participation when he entered into an employ-
ment contract with the corporation which allowed the majority shareholder to repurchase
his stock in the event of the termination of his employment, and which permitted
termination of employment for "any reason whatsoever." 336
It is quite conceivable that a Massachusetts court, or any other court working within
the parameters of the analysis proposed here, would not have reached the same result
as the Third Circuit in Coleman. The basis for a different outcome would lie in the fact
that the termination provision in the employment contract, which contains language
similar to an ADC, may be too generally framed to withstand a reasonable expectations
3" As an illustrative guide, see Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1982),
where the court, based on the plaintiff's naivety and trust, held the defendant responsible for
ensuring that the plaintiff understood that he would receive no growth interest when issued
nonparticipating preferred stock. Id.
326 See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
329 See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
"° Donahue, 367 Mass. at 598 n.24, 328 N.E.2d at 518 n.24.
551 See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 102-21 and accompanying text.
5" See supra notes 41-74 and accompanying text.
534 See supra notes 122-224 and accompanying text.
535 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981).
536 Id. at 636.
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scrutiny. A plaintiff could argue, in the face of such a provision's language, that he had
nonetheless presumed that his termination would be made only within circumstances
which would not violate his trust and confidence in his fellow shareholder. A court might
find it plausible, in the perspective of the partnership analogy, that the plaintiff had
understood that he would only be fired for good cause shown.
The employment context is particularly amenable to such an argument by a plaintiff,
because it is a context in which plaintiffs are particularly likely to appear vulnerable and
inexperienced. A court may readily find that such a shareholder failed to fully compre-
hend the ramifications of an ADC which permits his termination and/or divestiture of
interest without cause. Under the equitable principles of Donahue and the test proposed
in this note, the burden of clarifying those ramifications falls to the defendant at the
time that the agreement is executed. For that reason an ADC, the purpose of which is
to preclude a presumption of guaranteed employment, should probably be narrowly
formulated to expressly state that termination may be predicated solely upon the selfish
interests of the employee/shareholder's fellow shareholders, even to the injury of the
plaintiff.
For similar reasons, the blanket ADC may be virtually useless when used in relation
to an unsophisticated shareholder. A blanket ADC to which an inexperienced and
unsophisticated shareholder was a party would, under the instant test, require such
explicit clarity in explanatory language that it is difficult to conceive of conditions under
which the shareholder would be willing to sign, and in any event would probably be
found unconscionable.
Conversely, the case of a highly sophisticated shareholder, or a shareholder which
is itself a corporation, would be far less likely to present problems under this two-tiered
test, even with a blanket ADC. The Donahue presumption of pre-existing expectations
would be comparatively easy to rebut, and in fact might even be rebutted by the court
as a matter of law. As agreed to by a sophisticated, experienced or incorporated share-
holder, a narrowly tailored ADC would be virtually inviolate, as it would be almost
impossible to argue that the fiduciary disclaimer had not been understood, or that the
shareholder had no meaningful alternative to signing the ADC. Similar considerations
would probably operate to validate a blanket ADC as regards such a shareholder. In
either case, the reasonable expectations of the sophisticated shareholder would provide
the standard for evaluating the efficacy of the ADC. As with an unsophisticated share-
holder, the court would exercise its equitable powers to evaluate the ADC to determine
its effect on those reasonable expectations, as they existed at the time the ADC was
executed or adopted.
Thus, the reasonable expectations test operates to impose a duty upon the most
sophisticated shareholder entering into an ADC to ensure that it is fully comprehensible
to the least sophisticated, particularly if it is to later be exercised to the disadvantage of
the latter. The reasonable expectations of each, however, will serve as the standard of
conduct by which the other shareholders are to be judged. That evaluation should be
conducted by the court exercising the full range of its equitable powers, consequently
permitting it to consider all pertinent factors, including those, such as parol evidence,
which might ordinarily be excluded from evidence. In the exercise of its equitable
powers, the court would have available to it the full range of equitable remedies, includ-
ing restitution, reformation, recission and avoidance, in addition to pecuniary or punitive
damages.
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CONCLUSION
This note has explored the evolution of the close corporate/partnership analogy and
its concomitantly stricter fiduciary duty as demonstrated by the progenitors and progeny
of the Donahue case in Massachusetts, and a similar development in the law of the
Commonwealth countries. Consistent with this analogy, the note has argued that the
purpose and nature of the Donahue fiduciary duty is to protect the legitimate expectations
of close corporate shareholders that they are entering into a relationship of trust,
confidence, loyalty and utmost good faith with their fellow shareholders. The note has
outlined a responsive effort by the Massachusetts corporate bar to control the extent of
the Donahue duty by contractual disclaimer. The stated purpose of the note has been an
analysis of the efficacy of such a disclaimer.
The Donahue duty dictates a presumption that expectations of trust, confidence,
loyalty and utmost good faith are legitimately harbored by close corporate shareholders.
The consequence of that presumption, that such expectations are reasonably entertained
by the shareholders upon their entrance into the corporation, is a shifting of the burden
of proof to the defendant. The defendant may rebut this presumption by introducing
an ADC, a contractual disclaimer of those expectations.
Finally, the note has proposed a two-tiered test by which the efficacy of an ADC
may be considered. The first tier of this test operates in contract. It considers the
contractual validity of the ADC by examining the essential contractual criteria of ade-
quacy of consent, disclosure and consideration. The second tier operates in equity. It
considers the literal effect of the ADC on the reasonable expectations of the shareholder/
plaintiff. It also examines the ADC for unconscionability in result. On the basis of these
criteria it is suggested that an ADC is most likely to be effective where a shareholder is
well-informed, either by prior experience or by the explicit language of the ADC. It is
also suggested that these considerations will tend to lend greater credence to a narrowly
tailored ADC than to a blanket ADC because of the proportionately greater likelihood
that carefully formulated restrictive language has been understood. Although these
criteria should provide guidance, due to the nature of the fiduciary genre they cannot
pretend to provide a concise dispositive rule.
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